

Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda's

Ghaṭa Bhāṣya

Translated from
Kannada Book
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (Br.U.)

of

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DRAFT v 1.0

[Primary references: Bhāṣya Pāṭha of Vidwān Śrīhari (Venkateśa) Śarma, APK; and Sw. Madhavānanda]
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Note:

1. Bhāṣya in Sanskrit is followed by its IAST followed by its English translation.
2. BB stands for Bhāṣya Bhāga (part) number as in SSSS book. In this document it starts from 13 and goes up to 27.
3. Upaniṣad is identified by verse number. In this document the only verse is 1.2.1 (chapter/adhyāya 1, section/brāhmaṇa 2, verse 1).

द्वितीयं ब्राह्मणम्

dvitīyaṃ brāhmaṇam

2nd Section

Introduction to the Section

BHĀṢYA -

BB 13

अथाग्नेरश्वमेधोपयोगिकस्योत्पत्तिरुच्यते । तद्विषयदर्शनविवक्षयैवोत्पत्तिः स्तुत्यर्था ।

athāgneraśvamedhopayogikasyotpattirucyate | tadviṣyadarśanavivakṣayaivotpattiḥ stutyarthā |

BB 13

BHĀṢYA -Now the origin of the fire that is fit for use in the horse sacrifice is being described. This story of its origin is meant as an eulogy in order to prescribe a meditation (darśana) concerning it.

Upaniṣad 1.2.1

नैवेह किञ्चनाग्र आसीन्मृत्युनैवेदमावृतमासीदशनाययाशनाया हि मृत्युस्तन्मनोऽकुरुतात्मन्वी स्यामिति ।

सोऽर्चन्नचरत्तस्यार्चत आपोऽजायन्तार्चते वै मे कमभूदिति तदेवार्कस्यार्कत्वं कं ह वा अस्मै भवति य एवमेतदर्कस्यार्कत्वं वेद ॥ १ ॥

naiveha kiñcanāgra āsīnmr̥tyunaivedamāvṛtamāsīdaśanāyayāśanāyā hi mr̥tyustanmano'kurutātmanvī
syāmiti | so'rcannacarattasyārcata āpo'jāyantārcate vai me kamabhūditi tadevārkasyārkatvaṃ kaṃ ha vā
asmai bhavati ya evametadarkasyārkatvaṃ veda || 1 ||

TEXT - There was nothing whatsoever here in the beginning. It was covered (āvṛtam) only by death (mr̥tyu, hiraṇyagarbhaḥ), or hunger (āśanāya), for hunger is death. He created the mind, thinking, 'let me be self (ātmanvanta)'. He moved about doing arcana (worshiping himself). As he was doing arcana, ap (water) was produced. (Since he thought), 'as I was worshiping (arcana), water (kaṃ) sprang up,' therefore arka (fire) is so called. water (kaṃ, also happiness) surely comes to one who knows how arka (fire) came to have this name of arka.

BHĀṢYA-

BB 14

नैवेह किञ्चनाग्र आसीत् इह संसारमण्डले, किञ्चन किञ्चिदपि नामरूपप्रविभक्तविशेषम्, नैवासीत् न बभूव, अग्रे प्रागुत्पत्तेर्मनआदेः ॥

BB 14

naiveha kiñcanāgra āsīt iha saṃsāramaṇḍale, kiñcana kiñcidapi nāmarūpapravibhaktaviśeṣam, naivāsīt na babhūva, agre prāgutpattermanaādeḥ ||

BHĀṢYA- The meaning of “naiveha kiñcanāgra āsīt (in verse Br.U.1.2.1) is that there was nothing whatsoever differentiated by name and form here, in the universe, in the beginning, i.e., before the manifestation of the mind etc. [1]

Footnotes:

1. Later it is said the mind etc., were created by hiraṇyagarbhaḥ.

BB 15

किं शून्यमेव बभूव ? शून्यमेव स्यात् ; 'नैवेह किञ्चन' इति श्रुतेः, न कार्य कारणं वासीत् ; उत्पत्तेश्च ; उत्पद्यते हि घटः ; अतः प्रागुत्पत्तेर्घटस्य नास्तित्वम् । ननु कारणस्य न नास्तित्वम्, मृत्पिण्डादिदर्शनात् ; यन्नोपलभ्यते तस्यैव नास्तिता । अस्तु कार्यस्य, न तु कारणस्य, उपलभ्यमानत्वात् । न, प्रागुत्पत्तेः सर्वानुपलम्भात् । अनुपलब्धिश्चेदभावहेतुः, सर्वस्य जगतः प्रागुत्पत्तेर्न कारणं कार्यं वोपलभ्यते ; तस्मात्सर्वस्यैवाभावोऽस्तु ॥

BB 15

kiṃ śūnyameva babhūva ? śūnyameva syāt ; 'naiveha kiñcana' iti śruteḥ, na kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ vāsīt ; utpatteśca ; utpadyate hi ghaṭaḥ ; ataḥ prāgutpatterghaṭasya nāstitvam । nanu kāraṇasya na nāstitvam, mr̥tpiṇḍādidarśanāt ; yannopalabhyate tasyaiva nāstitā । astu kāryasya, na tu kāraṇasya, upalabhyamānatvāt । na, prāgutpatteḥ sarvānupalambhāt । anupalabdhīścedabhāvahetuḥ, sarvasya jagataḥ prāgutpatterna kāraṇaṃ kāryaṃ vopalabhyate ; tasmātsarvasyaivābhāvo'stu ||

Satkāryavāda bhāṣya Śūnyavādi argument

BB 15

BHĀṢYA - (Question): Was it altogether void?

(Nihilist): It must be so, for the Śruti [1] says, 'there was nothing whatsoever here.' There was neither effect (kārya) nor cause (kāraṇa). Also because of origination (utpatti, we should understand so [2]). A jar, for instance, is produced. Hence before its origin it must not have been there (na astitvam, or has no is-ness).

(Objection): We cannot say there is no cause, for we see the lump of clay (mr̥tṇiṇḍādi darśanāt), for instance (before the jar is produced) [3]. An unobserved (anupalabhya) thing may well have no is-ness (na astitvam, non-existent), as is the case with the effect here. But not so for cause, for it is observed (or obtained) [4].

(Nihilist resolution): No, because prior to birth (origin) all are unobserved. If not observed is the grounds (hetu) for its abhāva (absence, non-existence), before the birth of the universe neither cause nor effect is observed. Hence everything must have been non-existent.

Questions + SSSS Footnotes

1. Why, of all people, the nihilist is quoting the śruti?
2. Is this (being not-there before birth) important for the nihilist?
3. This seems to accept that clay is the cause of the lump, which is the cause of the jar.
4. Just as in a jar, there must be some observed cause; otherwise, it cannot be born. Vaiśeṣika-s accept the effect can be asat before birth; but, unlike nihilists, do not accept cause is also asat.

BB 16

न, 'मृत्युनैवेदमावृतामासीत्' इति श्रुतेः ; यदि हि किञ्चिदपि नासीत् , येनाव्रियते यच्चाव्रियते, तदा नावक्ष्यत् ,
'मृत्युनैवेदमावृतम्' इति ; न हि भवति गगनकुसुमच्छत्रो वन्ध्यापुत्र इति ; ब्रवीति च 'मृत्युनैवेदमावृतमासीत्' इति ।
तस्मात् येनावृतं कारणेन, यच्चावृतं कार्यम् , प्रागुत्पत्तेस्तदुभयमासीत् , श्रुतेः प्रामाण्यात् , अनुमेयत्वाच्च । अनुमीयते च
प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यकारणयोरस्तित्वम् । कार्यस्य हि सतो जायमानस्य कारणे सत्युत्पत्तिदर्शनात् , असति चादर्शनात् ,
जगतोऽपि प्रागुत्पत्तेः कारणास्तित्वमनुमीयते, घटादिकारणास्तित्ववत् ।

Siddhānta: kārya and kāraṇa are both Sat

BB 16

na, 'mr̥tṇyunaivedamāvṛtāmāsīt' iti śruteḥ ; yadi hi kiñcidapi nāsīt , yenāvriyate yaccāvriyate, tadā
nāvakṣyat , 'mr̥tṇyunaivedamāvṛtam' iti ; na hi bhavati gaganakusumacchanno vandhyāputra iti ; bravīti ca
'mr̥tṇyunaivedamāvṛtamāsīt' iti । tasmāt yenāvṛtaṃ kāraṇena, yaccāvṛtaṃ kāryam ,
prāgutpattestadubhayamāsīt , śruteḥ prāmāṇyāt , anumeyatvācca । anumīyate ca prāgutpatteḥ

kāryakāraṇayorastitvam | kāryasya hi sato jāyamānasya kāraṇe satyutpattidarśanāt , asati cādarśanāt , jagato'pi prāgutpatteḥ kāraṇāstitvamanumīyate, ghaṭādikāraṇāstitvavat |

BB 16

BHĀṢYA - (Vedantin): Not so, for the śruti says, 'It was covered only by death. Had there been absolutely nothing either to cover or to be covered, the Śruti would not have said, 'It was covered by death.' For it never happens that a barren woman's son is covered with flowers springing from the sky. Yet the Śruti says, 'It was covered only by death [1]'. Therefore, on the authority of the Śruti we conclude that the cause which covered, and the effect which was covered, were both there (existent) before the origin of the universe [2].

Inference also points to this conclusion. We can infer the existence of the cause and effect before creation. We observe that an effect produced takes place only when there is a cause and does not take place when there is no cause [3]. From this we infer that the cause of the universe too must have existed before creation, as is the case with the cause of a jar, for instance.

SSSS Footnotes:

1. If both cause and effect are asat (not there at all, or non-existent), the term 'covering' does not make sense.
2. Vedantin's accept that cause and effect exist prior to creation, based on śruti pramāna.
3. Whenever there is smoke there is fire; when no fire , there is no smoke.

BB 17

घटादिकारणस्याप्यसत्त्वमेव, अनुपमृद्य मृत्पिण्डादिकं घटाद्यनुत्पत्तेरिति चेत् , न ; मृदादेः कारणत्वात् । मृत्सुवर्णादि हि तत्र कारणं घटरुचकादेः, न पिण्डाकारविशेषः, तदभावे भावात् । असत्यपि पिण्डाकारविशेषे मृत्सुवर्णादिकारणद्रव्यमात्रादेव घटरुचकादिकार्योत्पत्तिर्दृश्यते । तस्मान्न पिण्डाकारविशेषो घटरुचकादिकारणम् । असति तु मृत्सुवर्णादिद्रव्ये घटरुचकादिर्न जायत इति मृत्सुवर्णादिद्रव्यमेव कारणम् , न तु पिण्डाकारविशेषः । सर्वं हि कारणं कार्यमुत्पादयत् , पूर्वोत्पन्नस्यात्मकार्यस्य तिरोधानं कुर्वत् , कार्यान्तरमुत्पादयति ; एकस्मिन्कारणे युगपदनेककार्यविरोधात् । न च पूर्वकार्योपमर्दे कारणस्य स्वात्मोपमर्दो भवति । तस्मात्पिण्डाद्युपमर्दे कार्योत्पत्तिदर्शनमहेतुः प्रागुत्पत्तेः कारणासत्त्वे । पिण्डादिव्यतिरेकेण मृदादेरसत्त्वादयुक्तमिति चेत् — पिण्डादिपूर्वकार्योपमर्दे मृदादि कारणं नोपमृद्यते, घटादिकार्यान्तरेऽप्यनुवर्तते, इत्येतदयुक्तम्, पिण्डघटादिव्यतिरेकेण मृदादिकारणस्यानुपलम्भादिति चेत् , न ; मृदादिकारणानां घटाद्युत्पत्तौ पिण्डादिनिवृत्तावनुवृत्तिदर्शनात् ।

BB 17

ghaṭādikāraṇasyāpyasattvameva, anupamṛdya mṛtṭpiṇḍādikaṃ ghaṭādyanutpatteriti cet , na ; mṛdādeḥ kāraṇatvāt | mṛtsuvarṇādi hi tatra kāraṇaṃ ghaṭarucakādeḥ, na piṇḍākāraviśeṣaḥ, tadabhāve bhāvāt | asatyapi piṇḍākāraviśeṣe mṛtsuvarṇādikāraṇadravyamātrādeva ghaṭarucakādikāryotpattirdrśyate | tasmānna piṇḍākāraviśeṣo ghaṭarucakādikāraṇam | asati tu mṛtsuvarṇādidravye ghaṭarucakādirna jāyata iti mṛtsuvarṇādidravymeve kāraṇam , na tu piṇḍākāraviśeṣaḥ | sarvaṃ hi kāraṇaṃ kāryamutpādayat , pūrvotpannasyātmakāryasya tirodhānaṃ kurvat , kāryāntaramutpādayati ; ekasminkāraṇe yugapadanekakāryavirodhāt | na ca pūrvakāryopamarde kāraṇasya svātmopamardo bhavati |

tasmātpiṇḍādyupamarde kāryotpattidarśanamahetuḥ prāgutpatteḥ kāraṇāsattve | piṇḍādivyatirekeṇa mṛdāderasattvādayuktamiti cet — piṇḍādīpūrvakāryopamarde mṛdādi kāraṇaṃ nopamṛdyate, ghaṭādikāryāntare'pyanuvartate, ityeta dayuktam , piṇḍaghaṭādivyatirekeṇa mṛdādikāraṇasyānupalambhāditi cet , na ; mṛdādikāraṇānāṃ ghaṭādyutpattau piṇḍādinivṛttāvanuvṛttidarśanāt |

Establishing kāraṇa satva

BB 17

BHĀṢYA - (Bauddha): The cause of a jar is also asat (does not pre-exist), for the jar is not produced without destroying the lump of clay. And so with other things.[1]

(Siddhānti): Not so, for the clay (or other material) is the cause. The clay is the cause of the jar, and the gold of the necklace, and not the “particular lump-like form” [2] of the material, for they exist without it. We see that effects such as the jar and the necklace are produced simply when their materials, clay, and gold, are present, although the lump-like form may be absent. Therefore, this particular form is not the cause of the jar and the necklace. But when the clay and the gold are absent, the jar and the necklace are not produced, which shows that these materials, clay, and gold, are the cause, and not the lumpish form (na tu piṇḍākāravīṣeṣaḥ). Whenever a cause produces an effect, it does so by destroying another effect it produced just before, for the same cause cannot produce more than one effect at a time. But the cause, by destroying the previous effect, does not destroy itself (the svarūpa is not destroyed). Therefore, the fact that an effect is produced by destroying the previous effect, the lump, for instance, is not a valid reason (hetu) to disprove that the cause exists before the effect is produced [3].

(Bauddha): It is not correct, for the clay etc. cannot exist apart from the lump and so on (must have form). In other words, you cannot say that the cause, the clay, for example, is not destroyed when its previous effect, the lump or any other form, is destroyed, but that it passes on to some other effect such as the jar.

Because the cause, the clay or the like, is never apart from the lump or jar, and so on [4].

(Siddhānti): Not so, for we see those causes, the clay etc., persist (anuvṛtti) when the jar and other things have been produced, and the lump or any other form has gone.

SSSS Footnotes:

1. Only when the cause/kāraṇa gets destroyed the effect/kārya is born, according to Bauddhas. See BSBh 2.2.26.
2. This is the translation of ‘piṇḍākāravīṣeṣo’. The clay-lump and the gold-bar is the cause per Bauddhas; this is rejected in favor of formless cause, by vedantins.
3. Lump etc., are effects/kārya and not cause/kāraṇa (for vedantin).
4. Essentially, Bauddha is saying, it is a series of products going from one to another always with some “form” or the other. There is no supreme cause apart from the world of products. In vedanta, though we accept intermediate cause-effects, Brahman is accepted as supreme cause [within the world of causality].

BB 18

सादृश्यादन्वयदर्शनम् , न कारणानुवृत्तेरिति चेत् , न ; पिण्डादिगतानां मृदाद्यवयवानामेव घटादौ प्रत्यक्षत्वेऽनुमानाभासात्सादृश्यादिकल्पनानुपपत्तेः । न च प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्विरुद्धाव्यभिचारिता, प्रत्यक्षपूर्वकत्वादनुमानस्य ; सर्वत्रैवानाश्वासप्रसङ्गात् — यदि च क्षणिकं सर्वं तदेवेदमिति गम्यमानम् , तद्बुद्धेरप्यन्यतद्बुद्ध्यपेक्षत्वे तस्या अप्यन्यतद्बुद्ध्यपेक्षत्वमित्यनवस्थायाम् , तत्सदृशमिदमित्यस्या अपि बुद्धेर्मृषात्वात् , सर्वत्रानाश्वासतैव । तदिदम्बुद्ध्योरपि कर्त्रभावे सम्बन्धानुपपत्तिः । सादृश्यात्तत्सम्बन्ध इति चेत् , न ; तदिदम्बुद्ध्योरितरेतरविषयत्वानुपपत्तेः । असति चेतरेतरविषयत्वे सादृश्यग्रहणानुपपत्तिः । असत्येव सादृश्ये तद्बुद्धिरिति चेत् , न ; तदिदम्बुद्ध्योरपि सादृश्यबुद्धिवदसद्विषयत्वप्रसङ्गात् । असद्विषयत्वमेव सर्वबुद्धीनामस्त्विति चेत् , न ; बुद्धिबुद्धेरप्यसद्विषयत्वप्रसङ्गात् । तदप्यस्त्विति चेत् , न ; सर्वबुद्धीनां मृषात्वेऽसत्यबुद्ध्यनुपपत्तेः । तस्मादसदेतत् — सादृश्यात्तद्बुद्धिरिति । अतः सिद्धः प्राक्कार्योत्पत्तेः कारणसद्भावः ॥

Kāraṇa anvaya buddhi- not from similarity

BB 18

sādrśyādanvayadarśanam , na kāraṇānuvṛtteri cet , na ; piṇḍādigatānāṃ mṛdādyavayavānāmeva ghaṭādau pratyakṣatve'numānābhāsātsādrśyādikalpanānupapatteḥ । na ca pratyakṣānumānāyorviruddhāvvyabhicāritā, pratyakṣapūrvakatvādanumānasya ; sarvatraivānāśvāsaprasaṅgāt — yadi ca kṣaṇikam sarvaṃ tadevedamiti gamyamānam , tadbuddherapyanyatadbuddhyapekṣatve tasyā apyanyatadbuddhyapekṣatvamityanavasthāyām , tatsadrśsamidamityasyā api buddhermṛṣātāvāt , sarvatrānāśvāsataiva । tadidambuddhyorapi kartrabhāve sambandhānupapattiḥ । sādrśyāttatsambandha iti cet , na ; tadidambuddhyoritaretaraviṣayatvānupapatteḥ । asati cetaretaraviṣayatve sādrśyagrahaṇānupapattiḥ । asatyeva sādrśye tadbuddhiriti cet , na ; tadidambuddhyorapi sādrśyabuddhivadasadviṣayatvaprasaṅgāt । asadviṣayatvameva sarvabuddhīnāmastviti cet , na ; buddhibuddherapyasadviṣayatvaprasaṅgāt । tadapyastviti cet , na ; sarvabuddhīnāṃ mṛṣātve'satyabuddhyanupapatteḥ । tasmādasadetat — sādrśyāttadbuddhiriti । ataḥ siddhaḥ prakāryotpatteḥ kāraṇasadbhāvaḥ ॥

BB 18

BHĀṢYA - (Bauddha): Persistence is due to “similarity”, not due to cause!

(Siddhānti): No. Since the particles of clay or such which belonged to the lump etc. are directly observed (pratyakṣa) in the jar etc., it is unreasonable to imagine similarity through a pseudo-inference (anumāna ābhāsa).

Proposition: Inference is subordinate to pratyakṣa (and similarity is inference)

Nor is inference valid when it contradicts direct observation (pratyakṣa), for it depends on the latter, and the contrary view will result in a general disbelief [1]. That is to say, if everything observed as 'this is that' is momentary, then the notion (= buddhi) of 'that' would depend on another notion regarding something else, and so on, thus leading to a regress ad infinitum; and the notion of 'this is like that' being also

falsified thereby, there would be no certainty anywhere [2]. Besides, the two notions of 'this' and 'that' cannot be connected since there is no abiding subject (kartru) [3].

(*SSSS notes:

1. Why is inference pseudo (incorrect) when it contradicts pratyakṣa? Why can't we call pratyakṣa as incorrect instead? Because: Inference is supported by pratyakṣa, and not the other way around. If pratyakṣa is taken to be incorrect, then surely the dependent inference should also be so.
2. [Similarity is an inference]. Suppose when there is a direct observation (pratyabhijñāna pratyakṣa) that the particles of 'that' clay are 'this', it is rejected in favor of similarity buddhi (notion). Then, given that similarity is based on pratyakṣa, similarity will have to be rejected as well.
3. A common subject who has buddhi of 'this' and 'that' needs to claim similarity.)

BHĀṢYA continued-

Objection: They would be connected through the similarity between them.

(Siddhānti): No, for the notions (= buddhi) of 'this' and 'that' cannot be the object of each other's perception, and (since according to you there is no abiding subject like the Self), there would be no perception of similarity [1].

(Bauddha): Although there is no similarity, there is the notion of it.

(Siddhānti): Then the notions of 'this' and 'that' would also, like the notion of similarity, be based on nonentities [2].

Objection (by the Yogacara school): Let all notions be based on nonentities. (What is the harm?) [3]

(Siddhānti): Then your view that everything is an idea would also be based on a nonentity.

(Bauddha): Let it be. [4]

(Siddhānti). If all notions are false, your view that all notions are unreal cannot be established [5]. Therefore, it is wrong to say that recognition takes place through similarity. Hence it is proved that the cause exists before the effect is produced. The effect too exists before it is produced (kāraṇasadbhāvaḥ).

SSSS notes:

1. This is the response to the bauddha's doubt: 'that is this' is based on similarity, and therefore 'this is similar to that' is the principle. If understanding (vijñāna) is based on the 'present moment or instant' only, and not on past or future instants, how can there be a relation between 'that' understood in one moment and 'this' understood in a different moment.
2. One would infer this way based on the (illustration) of the notion of similarity.
3. That school has no kāraṇa and no kārya; so, the notions (buddhi) need not be rooted in an entity.

4. Let all be śūnya - is pūrva pakṣa position.
5. If you accept that śūnya buddhi has no entity, then śūnya itself gets annulled (impossibility).

BB 19

कार्यस्य च अभिव्यक्तिलिङ्गत्वात् । कार्यस्य च सद्भावः प्रागुत्पत्तेः सिद्धः ; कथमभिव्यक्तिलिङ्गत्वात् — अभिव्यक्तिर्लिङ्गमस्येति ? अभिव्यक्तिः साक्षाद्विज्ञानालम्बनत्वप्राप्तिः । यद्धि लोके प्रावृतं तमआदिना घटादि वस्तु, तदालोकादिना प्रावरणतिरस्कारेण विज्ञानविषयत्वं प्राप्नुवत् , प्राक्सद्भावं न व्यभिचरति ; तथेदमपि जगत् प्रागुत्पत्तेरित्यवगच्छामः । न ह्यविद्यमानो घटः उदितेऽप्यादित्ये उपलभ्यते । न ; ते अविद्यमानत्वाभावादुपलभ्येतैवेति चेत् — न हि तव घटादि कार्यं कदाचिदप्यविद्यमानमित्युदिते आदित्ये उपलभ्येतैव, मृत्पिण्डेसन्निहिते तमआद्यावरणे चासति विद्यमानत्वादिति चेत् , न ; द्विविधत्वादावरणस्य । घटादिकार्यस्य द्विविधं ह्यावरणम् — मृदादेरभिव्यक्तस्य तमःकुड्यादि, प्राङ्मृदोऽभिव्यक्तेर्मृदाद्यवयवानां पिण्डादिकार्यान्तररूपेण संस्थानम् । तस्मात्प्रागुत्पत्तेर्विद्यमानस्यैव घटादिकार्यस्यावृतत्वादनुपलब्धिः । नष्टोत्पन्नभावाभावशब्दप्रत्ययभेदस्तु अभिव्यक्तिरोभावयोर्द्विविधत्वापेक्षः ।

BB 19

kāryasya ca abhivyaktiṅgatvāt | kāryasya ca sadbhāvaḥ prāgutpatteḥ siddhaḥ ;
kathamabhivyaktiṅgatvāt — abhivyaktirliṅgamasyeti ? abhivyaktiḥ sāksādvijñānālanbanatvaprāptiḥ |
yaddhi loke prāvṛtaṁ tamaādīnā ghaṭādi vastu, tadālokādīnā prāvaraṇatiraskāreṇa vijñānaviṣayatvaṁ
prāpnuvat , prāksadbhāvaṁ na vyabhicarati ; tathedamapi jagat prāgutpatterityavagacchāmaḥ | na
hyavidyamāno ghaṭaḥ udite'pyāditye upalabhyate | na ; te avidyamānatvābhāvādupalabhyetaiveti cet —
na hi tava ghaṭādi kāryaṁ kadācidapyavidyamānamityudite āditye upalabhyetaiva, mṛtṭpīṇḍesannihite
tamaādyāvaraṇe cāsati vidyamānatvāditi cet , na ; dvividhatvādāvaraṇasya | ghaṭādikāryasya dvividhaṁ
hyāvaraṇam — mṛdāderabhivyaktasya tamaḥkuḍyādi, prāṅmṛdo'bhivyaktermṛdādyavayavānām
piṇḍādikāryāntararūpeṇa samsthānam | tasmātpṛāgutpattervidyamānasyaiva
ghaṭādikāryasyāvṛtatvādanupalabdhīḥ | naṣṭotpannabhāvābhāvāśabdapratyayabhedastu
abhivyaktitirobhāvayordvividhatvāpekṣaḥ |

Kārya satva sādhana

BB 19

BHĀṢYA - The effect (pre-exists) because of its manifestation itself is indication (abhivyakti liṅgatvāt). (Being explained). It exists prior to its birth. The sense is its manifestation (abhivyakti) itself is the indicator.

Manifestation means becoming an object directly to awareness (sāksāt vijñāna ālambanatva). It is a common occurrence that a thing, a jar for instance, which was hidden by darkness (āvṛtaṁ) or any other thing and comes within the range of awareness when the obstruction (āvaraṇa, covering) is removed by the appearance of light or in some other way, does not preclude its previous existence. Similarly, this universe too, we can understand, existed before its manifestation [1]. For a 'jar that is non-existent' does not become an object of awareness even when the sun rises.

(Bauddha): No, it must be perceived, for you deny its previous non-existence. According to you, any effect, say a jar, is never non-existent. So it must be perceived when the sun rises. Its previous form, the lump of clay, is nowhere near, and obstructions like darkness are absent; so, being existent, it cannot but appear [2].

(Siddhānti): Not so, for obstruction/covering (āvaraṇa) is of two kinds. Every effect such as a jar has two kinds of obstruction [explicit and implicit]. When it has become manifest from its component clay, (something like) darkness and the wall etc. are the obstructions [explicit]; while before its manifestations from the clay the obstruction is that the particles of clay remain as some other effect such as a lump (piṇḍādi kāryāntara rūpa; implicit). Therefore, the effect, the jar, although existent, is not perceived before its manifestation, as it is hidden [3]. The terms and concepts 'destroyed,' 'produced,' 'existence/is' and 'non-existence/is-not' depend on this twofold character of manifestation and disappearance (pratyaya bheda) [4].

SSSS Footnotes:

1. The kārya jagat (product universe) should exist even in cessation (pralaya), just as jars in darkness.
2. The sense is: in the previous sentence, reference to ‘jar that is non-existent’ does not befit a siddhānti because in his position even before its birth the jar exists!
3. It is hidden as it is in the form of another product (kāryāntara); it is so covered (āvaraṇa) or concealed.
4. When the covering due to a clay-lump is gone, we say a jar is ‘produced’; when jar’s pieces are seen, we say the jar is ‘destroyed’ [but the jar ‘is’].

BB 20

पिण्डकपालादेरावरणवैलक्षण्यादयुक्तमिति चेत् — तमःकुड्यादि हि घटाद्यावरणं घटादिभिन्नदेशं दृष्टम् ; न तथा घटादिभिन्नदेशे दृष्टे पिण्डकपाले ; तस्मात्पिण्डकपालसंस्थानयोर्विद्यमानस्यैव घटस्यावृतत्वादनुपलब्धिरित्ययुक्तम् , आवरणधर्मवैलक्षण्यादिति चेत् , न ; क्षीरोदकादेः क्षीराद्यावरणेनैकदेशत्वदर्शनात् । घटादिकार्ये कपालचूर्णाद्यवयवानामन्तर्भावादानावरणत्वमिति चेत् , न ; विभक्तानाङ्कार्यन्तरत्वादावरणत्वोपपत्तेः ।

BB 20

piṇḍakapālāderāvaraṇavilakṣaṇyādayuktamiti cet — tamaḥkuḍyādi hi ghaṭādyāvaraṇaṃ ghaṭādibhinnadeśaṃ dṛṣṭam ; na tathā ghaṭādibhinnadeśe dṛṣṭe piṇḍakapāle ; tasmātpiṇḍakapālasamsthānayorvidyamānasyaiva ghaṭasyāvṛtatvādanupalabdhirityayuktam , āvaraṇadharmavilakṣaṇyāditi cet , na ; kṣīrodakādeḥ kṣīrādyāvaraṇenaikadeśatvadarśanāt । ghaṭādikārye kapālacūrnādyavayavānāmantarbhāvādanāvaraṇatvamiti cet , na ; vibhaktānānkāryāntaratvādāvaraṇatvopapatteḥ ।

BB 20

BHĀṢYA - (Bauddha): This is incorrect since the lump (piṇḍa) or halves (pieces, kapāla) of clay are of a different nature than the covering (āvaraṇa vailakṣaṇa). To explain: the covering to the manifestation of a jar, such as darkness or the wall are different spatially (bhinna deśa) from the jar, but the lump or the two halves of a jar are not. So, your statement that the jar, although present in the form of the lump or the two halves, is not perceived because it is hidden, is wrong [1], for the nature of the obstruction in this case is different.

(Siddhānti):: No, for we see that water mixed with milk occupies the same space as the milk which conceals it.

(Bauddha): But since the component parts of a jar such as its two halves or pieces are included in the effect (jar), they should not prove obstructions at all [2].

(Siddhānti): Not so. When separated from the jar, they become many different effects, and can therefore serve as obstructions [3].

SSSS Footnotes:

1. The sense is once you accept the lump as a covering, to infer the manifestation of jar as indication of kārya-satva (is-ness of the lump) is incorrect.
2. The sense is that since (the pieces of) the covering are there, the effect jar should not be seen!
3. When the jar is manifested, the parts/lump are not covering. When the jar is unmanifest (avyakta), the parts/lump seen in clay are a covering (of the jar, as an alternative).

BB 21

आवरणाभावे एव यत्नः कर्तव्य इति चेत् — पिण्डकपालावस्थयोर्विद्यमानमेव घटादि कार्यमावृतत्वान्नोपलभ्यत इति चेत् , घटादिकार्यार्थिना तदावरणविनाशे एव यत्नः कर्तव्यः, न घटाद्युत्पत्तौ ; न चैतदस्ति ; तस्माद्युक्तं विद्यमानस्यैवावृतत्वादानुपलब्धिः, इति चेत् , न ; अनियमात् । न हि विनाशमात्रप्रयत्नादेव घटाद्यभिव्यक्तिर्नियता ; तमआद्यावृते घटादौ प्रदीपाद्युत्पत्तौ प्रयत्नदर्शनात् । सोऽपि तमोनाशायैवेति चेत् — दीपाद्युत्पत्तावपि यः प्रयत्नः सोऽपि तमस्तिरस्करणाय ; तस्मिन्नष्टे घटः स्वयमेवोपलभ्यते ; न हि घटे किञ्चिदाधीयत इति चेत् , न ; प्रकाशवतो घटस्योपलभ्यमानत्वात् । यथा प्रकाशविशिष्टो घट उपलभ्यते प्रदीपकरणे, न तथा प्राक्प्रदीपकरणात् । तस्मान्न तमस्तिरस्करणायैव प्रदीपकरणम् ; किं तर्हि, प्रकाशवत्त्वाय ; प्रकाशवत्त्वेनैवोपलभ्यमानत्वात् । क्वचिदावरणविनाशेऽपि यत्नः स्यात् ; यथा कुड्यादिविनाशे । तस्मान्न नियमोऽस्ति — अभिव्यक्त्यर्थिनावरणविनाशे एव यत्नः कार्य इति । नियमार्थवत्त्वाच्च । कारणे वर्तमानं कार्यं कार्यान्तराणामावरणमित्यवोचाम । तत्र यदि पूर्वाभिव्यक्तस्य कार्यस्य पिण्डस्य व्यवहितस्य वा कपालस्य विनाशे एव यत्नः क्रियेत, तदा विदलचूर्णाद्यपि कार्यं जायेत । तेनाप्यावृतो घटो नोपलभ्यत इति पुनः प्रयत्नान्तरापेक्षैव । तस्माद्घटाद्यभिव्यक्त्यर्थिनो नियत एव कारकव्यापारोऽर्थवान् । तस्मात्प्रागुत्पत्तेरपि सदेव कार्यम् ।

BB 21

āvaraṇābhāve eva yatnaḥ kartavya iti cet — piṇḍakapālāvasthayorvidyamānameva ghaṭādi kāryamāvṛtatvānopalabhyata iti cet , ghaṭādikāryārthinā tadāvaraṇavināśe eva yatnaḥ kartavyaḥ, na ghaṭādyutpattau ; na caitadasti ; tasmādayuktaṃ vidyamānasyaivāvṛtatvādanupalabdhiḥ, iti cet , na ;

aniyamāt | na hi vināśamātraprayatnādeva ghaṭādyabhivyaktirniyatā ; tamaādyāvṛte ghaṭādau pradīpādyutpattau prayatnadarśanāt | so'pi tamonāśāyaiveti cet — dīpādyutpattāvapi yaḥ prayatnaḥ so'pi tamastiraskaraṇāya ; tasminnaṣṭe ghaṭaḥ svayamevopalabhyate ; na hi ghaṭe kiñcidādhīyata iti cet , na ; prakāśavato ghaṭasyopalabhyamānatvāt | yathā prakāśaviśiṣṭo ghaṭa upalabhyate pradīpakaraṇe, na tathā prākpradīpakaraṇāt | tasmānna tamastiraskaraṇāyaiva pradīpakaraṇam ; kiṃ tarhi, prakāśavattvāya ; prakāśavattvenaivopalabhyamānatvāt | kvacidāvaraṇavināśe'pi yatnaḥ syāt ; yathā kuḍyādivināśe | tasmānna niyamo'sti — abhivyaktyarthināvaraṇavināśe eva yatnaḥ kārya iti | niyamārthavattvācca | kāraṇe vartamānaṃ kāryaṃ kāryāntarāṇāmāvaraṇamityavocāma | tatra yadi pūrvābhivyaktasya kāryasya piṇḍasya vyavahitasya vā kapālasya vināśe eva yatnaḥ kriyeta, tadā vidalacūrṇādyapi kāryaṃ jāyeta | tenāpyāvṛto ghaṭo nopalabhyata iti punaḥ prayatnāntarāpekṣaiva | tasmādghaṭādyabhivyaktyarthino niyata eva kārakavyāpāro'rthavān | tasmātprāgutpatterapi sadeva kāryam |

BB 21

BHĀṢYA - (Bauddha): Then the effort should be directed solely to the removal of the obstructions. That is to say, if, as you (vedantin) say, the effect, the jar for instance, is actually present in the state of the lump or the two halves, and is not perceived because of an obstruction, then one who wants that effect, the jar, should 'just' try to remove the obstruction, and not (actually) make the jar. But as a matter of fact, nobody does so [1]. Therefore, your statement is wrong [from process viewpoint].

(Siddhānti): No. There is no such rule about it. Attempts to destroy the covering need not make the jar manifest. Because, when a jar is covered with darkness, it is also found that one attempts to light a lamp.

(Bauddha): That is only for destroying the darkness (described next). Attempts to light a lamp is merely for removing the (covering of) darkness, which when accomplished the jar will be automatically perceived. Nothing (no new property) is added to the jar.

(Siddhānti): No. The light together with the jar is perceived (described next). After the lamp is lit, the jar along with the light is seen, and not before (lamp is lit). Therefore, lighting is not merely for removing darkness, it renders (the jar) joining with light (prakāśavattvāya [2]). It comes to be known (upalabhya, to us) only as joined with light. In some instances, we have to destroy the coverings too. For example, when an obstructing wall is pulled down. Therefore, there is no rule that one wishing manifestation of something must only try to remove obstructions.

Also, for niyamārthavattva: (from the necessity of making the product, or process viewpoint referred to above; described next). We already said an effect patent in the cause serves as a covering/obstruction to other effects. So, if one tries only to destroy the previously manifested effects such as the lump or the two halves which stand between it and the jar, one will end up with powder and pieces as effects [3]. These too will cover the jar and prevent it being perceived; so, a fresh attempt will be needed. Therefore, one wishing to manifest a product should follow the known procedures (kāraṇa vyāpāra) of utility [and not blindly remove covering!]. Therefore, the effect exists even before its manifestation.

SSSS Footnotes:

1. This is a drsta-arthāpatti example for a newly born jar which was non-existent earlier.

2. Without light a jar is not observed, so light isn't necessary for pratyakṣa. This does not contradict Ma.U.Bh (BB 39) where it is said the knowledge of jar (ghaṭa jñāna) does not create a property (dharma) of knowability (jñātatva) in the jar.
3. Because when there is a covering the effect is not observed. Also, one effect may cover other effects. So, merely destroying the cover may result in undesired products.

BB 22

अतीतानागतप्रत्ययभेदाच्च । अतीतो घटोऽनागतो घट इत्येतयोश्च प्रत्यययोर्वर्तमानघटप्रत्ययवन्न निर्विषयत्वं युक्तम् । अनागतार्थिप्रवृत्तेश्च । न ह्यसत्यर्थितया प्रवृत्तिलोके दृष्टा । योगिनां चातीतानागतज्ञानस्य सत्यत्वात् । असंश्लेद्धविष्यद्घटः, ऐश्वरं भविष्यद्घटविषयं प्रत्यक्षज्ञानं मिथ्या स्यात् ; न च प्रत्यक्षमुपचर्यते ; घटसद्भावे ह्यनुमानमवोचाम । विप्रतिषेधाच्च । यदि घटो भविष्यतीति, कुलालादिषु व्याप्रियमाणेषु घटार्थम्, प्रमाणेन निश्चितम्, येन च कालेन घटस्य सम्बन्धो भविष्यतीत्युच्यते, तस्मिन्नेव काले घटोऽसन्निति विप्रतिषिद्धमभिधीयते ; भविष्यन्घटोऽसन्निति, न भविष्यतीत्यर्थः ; अयं घटो न वर्तत इति यद्वत् । अथ प्रागुत्पत्तेर्घटोऽसन्नित्युच्येत — घटार्थं प्रवृत्तेषु कुलालादिषु तत्र यथा व्यापाररूपेण वर्तमानास्तावत्कुलालादयः, तथा घटो न वर्तत इत्यसच्छब्दस्यार्थश्चेत्, न विरुध्यते ; कस्मात् ? स्वेन हि भविष्यद्रूपेण घटो वर्तते ; न हि पिण्डस्य वर्तमानता, कपालस्य वा, घटस्य भवति ; न च तयोः, भविष्यत्ता घटस्य ; तस्मात्कुलालादिव्यापारवर्तमानतायां प्रागुत्पत्तेर्घटोऽसन्निति न विरुध्यते । यदि घटस्य यत्त्वं भविष्यत्ताकार्यरूपं तत् प्रतिषिध्येत, तत्प्रतिषेधे विरोधः स्यात् ; न तु तद्भवान्प्रतिषेधति ; न च सर्वेषां क्रियावतामेकैव वर्तमानता भविष्यत्त्वं वा ।

BB 22

atītānāgatapratyayabhedācca | atīto ghaṭo'nāgato ghaṭa ityetayośca
 pratyayayorvartamānaghaṭapratyayavanna nirviṣayatvaṃ yuktaṃ | anāgatārthipravṛtteśca | na
 hyasatyarthitayā pravṛttirloke dṛṣṭā | yogināṃ cātītānāgatajñānasya satyatvāt | asaṃśleddbhaviṣyadghaṭaḥ,
 aiśvaram bhaviṣyadghaṭaviṣayam pratyakṣajñānam mithyā syāt ; na ca pratyakṣamupacaryate ;
 ghaṭasadbhāve hyanumānamavocāma | vipratishedhācca | yadi ghaṭo bhaviṣyatīti, kulālādiṣu
 vyāpriyamāṇeṣu ghaṭārtham , pramāṇena niścitam , yena ca kālena ghaṭasya sambandho
 bhaviṣyatītyucyate, tasminneva kāle ghaṭo'sanniti vipratisheddhamabhidhīyate ; bhaviṣyanghaṭo'sanniti, na
 bhaviṣyatītyarthaḥ ; ayam ghaṭo na vartata iti yadvat | atha prāgutpatterghaṭo'sannityucyeta — ghaṭārtham
 pravṛtteṣu kulālādiṣu tatra yathā vyāpārarūpeṇa vartamānāstāvatkulālādayaḥ, tathā ghaṭo na vartata
 ityasacchabdasyārthaścet , na virudhyate ; kasmāt ? svena hi bhaviṣyadrūpeṇa ghaṭo vartate ; na hi
 piṇḍasya vartamānatā, kapālasya vā, ghaṭasya bhavati ; na ca tayor, bhaviṣyattā ghaṭasya ;
 tasmātkulālādivyāpāravartamānatāyām prāgutpatterghaṭo'sanniti na virudhyate | yadi ghaṭasya yatsvam
 bhaviṣyattākāryarūpaṃ tat pratiṣidhyeta, tatpratiṣedhe virodhaḥ syāt ; na tu tadbhavanpratiṣedhati ; na ca
 sarveṣāṃ kriyāvataṃekaiva vartamānatā bhaviṣyattvaṃ vā |

BB 22

BHĀṢYA - We also infer this from our divergent notions of the past and future (atīta anāgata pratyaya bheda). Notions of jar-that-was and jar-that-will-be are related to the notion of jar-that-is (present at hand) and cannot be independent. For, one who desires a jar-that-will-be sets himself to work for it. Because we do not see people strive for things which they know are completely non-existent (asat). And also because the yogi's infallible jñāna about past and future things [1]. If the jar-that-will-be is asat (completely non-existent), then Īśvara's direct knowledge (pratyakṣa jñānam) would be false (mithyā [2]). Nor is such

knowledge (pratyakṣa) a mere figure of speech [3]. Because, for the existence of the jar we have given the inference [4].

It will be a contradiction (if jar is non-existent). On seeing a potter (and other such folks) at work on the making of a jar, one becomes certain that the jar will be made based on pramāna; at that moment when the relation is established, it would be a contradiction to say the jar is not existent [5]. If you say the jar-to-be is *asat* (non-existent), then it just means jar-will-not-be.

If you say, jar does not exist (*asat*) before its birth while the potter is working to make the jar: the meaning of ‘*asat*’ śabda is during the time the potter is throwing the jar, the jar does not exist [6], then there is no contradiction. Why? Because the jar exists in its own future form (potential). The present-at-hand nature (*varтамānatā*, being-current) of lump and halves does not belong to the jar; (vice versa) nor is the to-be nature (*bhaviṣyatva*, being-in-future) of the jar belong to them [7]. Therefore, you do not contradict us when you say during the time the potter is still transacting (making the jar), the jar does not exist. If you say, the to-be-jar product form (*bhaviṣyat tat kārya rūpaṃ*) is not there (non-existent) then it would be incorrect. But you do not deny that. Nor do all things produced from acts (*kriya*) have the same relation to the present or the future [8].

SSSS Footnotes:

1. That the yogi-s see past, present, and future (yogi pratyakṣa in trikālika) is assumed here. [BG 15.11]
2. All Īśvara-vādis accept that Īśvara’s direct (pratyakṣa) and true (satya-vastu-viṣayaka) knowledge of all things is constant (nitya).
3. This is neither false knowledge (mithyājñāna) or metaphorical (upacāra). It is true knowledge (satya-jñāna).
4. Two inferences are said here: inference with manifestation as indication (*abhivyakti liṅga anumana*), and the inference on past and future jars (*anāgata ghaṭādi prāpti*). Therefore, the statements about them being yogi-pratyakṣa and Īśvara-pratyakṣa are not metaphorical.
5. Say, you go to a potter in the morning and he tells you the jar will be ready at noon and is busy working it till then. Upon hearing the potter, to think the jar is non-existent at noon is incorrect. Therefore, the jar-to-be exists.
6. The jar is not observed in the same way as the potter, the wheel etc., are observed in present time (*varтамāna*, during production).
7. The jar exists as jar-to-be. Until the jar manifests, the lump and halves exist in present form (*varтамāna rūpa*).
8. The present form of clay and the future forms of potter, wheel etc., are different. The potter’s present form is different from the future form of the jar. The past form (*atīta*) is similar to the future form (*anāgata*, discussed here). When the jar manifests, it is in the present, and the potter, wheel etc., are in the past. Why discuss forms of potter, wheel etc? When the jar manifests, potter etc are independent and no longer related.

अपि च, चतुर्विधानामभावानाम् , घटस्येतेतराभावो घटादन्यो ष्टः — यथा घटाभावः पटादिरेव, न घटस्वरूपमेव । न च घटाभावः सन्पटः अभावात्मकः ; किं तर्हि ? भावरूप एव । एवं घटस्य प्राक्प्रध्वंसात्यन्ताभावानामपि घटादन्यत्वं स्यात् , घटेन व्यपदिश्यमानत्वात् , घटस्येतेतराभाववत् ; तथैव भावात्मकताभावानाम् । एवं च सति, घटस्य प्रागभाव इति न घटस्वरूपमेव प्रागुत्पत्तेर्नास्ति । अथ घटस्य प्रागभाव इति घटस्य यत्स्वरूपं तदेवोच्येत, घटस्येति व्यपदेशानुपपत्तिः । अथ कल्पयित्वा व्यपदिश्येत, शिलापुत्रकस्य शरीरमिति यद्वत् ; तथापि घटस्य प्रागभाव इति कल्पितस्यैवाभावस्य घटेन व्यपदेशः, न घटस्वरूपस्यैव । अथार्थान्तरं घटाद्घटस्याभाव इति, उक्तोत्तरमेतत् ।

BB 23

api ca, caturvidhānāmabhāvānām , ghaṭasyetaretarābhāvo ghaṭādanyo ṣṭaḥ — yathā ghaṭābhāvaḥ paṭādireva, na ghaṭasvarūpameva । na ca ghaṭābhāvaḥ sanpaṭaḥ abhāvātmakaḥ ; kiṃ tarhi ? bhāvarūpa eva । evaṃ ghaṭasya prākpradhvaṃsātyantābhāvānāmapi ghaṭādanyatvaṃ syāt , ghaṭena vyapadiśyamānatvāt , ghaṭasyetaretarābhāvavat ; tathaiva bhāvātmakatābhāvānām । evaṃ ca sati, ghaṭasya prāgabhāva itī na ghaṭasvarūpameva prāgutpatternāsti । atha ghaṭasya prāgabhāva itī ghaṭasya yatsvarūpaṃ tadevocyeta, ghaṭasyeti vyapadeśānupapattiḥ । atha kalpayitvā vyapadiśyeta, śilāputrakasya śārīramiti yadvat ; tathāpi ghaṭasya prāgabhāva itī kalpitasyaivābhāvasya ghaṭena vyapadeśaḥ, na ghaṭasvarūpasyaiva । athārthāntaram ghaṭādghaṭasyābhāva itī, uktottarametat ।

BB 23

BHĀṢYA - Moreover, among the four kinds of abhāva-s (Sw.M translated as negations), the jar's itaretara-abhāva (mutual exclusion, or anyōnyabhāva) is seen to be other-than-the-jar. For example, a jar's abhāva is a cloth (or another thing), but not the jar itself (svarūpa).

So, the cloth, an abhāva of the jar in this context, is not abhāva-rūpa (nonentity) but a positive entity (bhāva-rūpa [1]). Similarly, the (other abhāva-s) prāg, pradhvaṃsa, and atyanta abhāva-s (respectively, abhāva-s before birth/creation, after death/destruction, and complete, like hare's horn) must also be other than the jar. Because (these three abhāva-s) we say are jar's abhāva-s, using the same term (śabda) jar as we do when we say 'jar's itaretara-abhāva'. These abhāva-s are also positive entities (bhāva rūpa) just like itaretara-abhāva. This being so, prāg abhāva does not mean that the jar's svarūpa is not there before its birth [2]. Moreover, if by saying prāg abhāva you are pointing jar's svarūpa, then to say 'there is (abhāva) of jar' is incongruous.

If you use it merely as a fancy, as in the expression, "the body of the stone sculpture," then the phrase 'the prāg abhāva of a jar' would only mean that it is the imaginary abhāva that is mentioned in terms of the jar [3], and not the jar itself. If, on the other hand, you say that the abhāva of a jar is something other than it, we have already answered the point [4].

SSSS Footnotes:

1. The mīmamsaka-s say, every entity is bhāva (positive) from its own svarūpa, and it's in abhāva when viewed from another object. Following this school, the vyavahāra bheda of jars and clothes, of bhāva and abhāva is expounded here. Imagining bheda in abhāva is wrong, say Tai.U.Bh (9, introduction), BSBh 2.1.18 (449), BGBh 18.48 (546) - all these from pāramartha drsti. So, no contradiction here.

2. Here Tīka (Ānandagiri) says- ghata is anādi, ananta, advaya, and sarvātma. But this is not seen in the bhāṣya.
3. In 'abhāva of jar,' if bheda is imagined, then abhāva will be imagined; then to say, jar is non-existent would be incongruous.
4. Because abhāva is bhāvātmaka, one cannot say svarūpa is non-existent. If it is said that the svarūpa of jar is non-existent before birth, then it is said so (to set up) the defect discussed next.

BB 24

किञ्चान्यत् ; प्रागुत्पत्तेः शशविषाणवदभावभूतस्य घटस्य स्वकारणसत्तासम्बन्धानुपपत्तिः, द्विनिष्ठत्वात्सम्बन्धस्य । अयुतसिद्धानामदोष इति चेत् , न ; भावाभावयोरयुतसिद्धत्वानुपपत्तेः । भावभूतयोर्हि युतसिद्धता अयुतसिद्धता वा स्यात् , न तु भावाभावयोरभावयोर्वा । तस्मात्सदेव कार्यं प्रागुत्पत्तेरिति सिद्धम् ॥

BB 24

kiñcānyat ; prāgutpatteḥ śaśaviṣāṇavadabhāvabhūtasya ghaṭasya svakāraṇasattāsambandhānupapattiḥ, dviniṣṭhatvātsambandhasya । ayutasiddhānāmadoṣa iti cet , na ; bhāvābhāvayorayutasiddhatvānupapatteḥ । bhāvabhūtayorhi yutasiddhatā ayutasiddhatā vā syāt , na tu bhāvābhāvayorabhāvayorvā । tasmātsadeva kāryam prāgutpatteriti siddham ॥

BB 24

BHĀṢYA - Moreover, if the jar before its manifestation be an complete abhāva (nonentity) like the proverbial horns of a hare (śaśaviṣāṇavat), it cannot be connected either with its cause or with existence (sat), for connection requires two positive entitles. If it is said to be connected with things that are inseparable, it would be incorrect. For, we cannot conceive of an inseparable connection between an existent and a non-existent thing. Separable or inseparable connection is possible between two positive entities only, not between an entity and a nonentity, nor between two nonentities. Therefore, we conclude that the effect does exist before it is manifested.

BB 25

किंलक्षणेन मृत्युनावृत्तमित्यत आह — अशनायया, अशितुमिच्छा अशनाया, सैव मृत्योर्लक्षणम् , तथा लक्षितेन मृत्युना अशनायया । कथमशनाया मृत्युरिति, उच्यते — अशनाया हि मृत्युः । हि - शब्देन प्रसिद्धं हेतुमवद्योतयति । यो ह्यशितुमिच्छति सोऽशनायानन्तरमेव हन्ति जन्तून् । तेनासावशनायया लक्ष्यते मृत्युरिति, अशनाया हीत्याह । बुद्ध्यात्मनोऽशनाया धर्म इति स एष बुद्ध्यवस्थो हिरण्यगर्भो मृत्युरित्युच्यते । तेन मृत्युनेदं कार्यमावृत्तमासीत् , यथा पिण्डावस्थया मृदा घटादय आवृताः स्युरिति तद्वत् ।

BB 25

kiṃlakṣaṇena mr̥tyunāvṛtamityata āha — aśanāyayā, aśitumicchā aśanāyā, saiva mr̥tyorlakṣaṇam , tayā lakṣitena mr̥tyunā aśanāyayā । kathamaśanāyā mr̥tyuriti, ucyate — aśanāyā hi mr̥tyuḥ । hi - śabdena prasiddham hetumavadyotayati । yo hyaśitumicchati so'śanāyānantarameva hanti jantūn । tenāsāvaśanāyayā lakṣyate mr̥tyuriti, aśanāyā hītyāha । buddhyātmano'aśanāyā dharmā ity ucyate । tena mr̥tyuneḍaṁ kāryamāvṛtāmasīत् , yathā piṇḍāvasthāyā mṛdā ghaṭādayāvṛtāḥ syūriti tadvत् ।

buddhyavastho hiraṇyagarbho mṛtyurityucyate | tena mṛtyunedam kāryamāvṛtamāsīt , yathā piṇḍāvasthaya mṛdā ghaṭādaya āvṛtāḥ syuriti tadvat |

mṛtyu means hiraṇyagarbhaḥ

BB 25

BHĀṢYA - By what form of death was (this) covered? This is being answered: By hunger (aśanāya), or the desire to eat, which is a characteristic of death. How is hunger death? The answer is being given: For hunger IS death. The particle 'hi' indicates a well-known reason, He who desires to eat kills animals immediately after. Therefore 'hunger' refers to death. Hence the use of the expression. 'Death' here means hiraṇyagarbhaḥ [1] as identified with the intellect (buddhyātmana), because hunger is an attribute of that which is so identified. This effect, the universe, was covered by that death, just as a jar etc. would be covered by clay in the form of a lump [2].

SSSS Footnotes:

1. Sri vārtikakāra takes the meaning of mṛtyu as paramātma. In this interpretation, taking the form of hiraṇyagarbha, paramātma created virāt purusa.
2. Though mṛtyu is not the primal cause, just as a jar is covered by effect of the form of piṇḍa, it was covered by hiraṇyagarbha .

BB 26

तन्मनोऽकुरुत, तदिति मनसो निर्देशः ; स प्रकृतो मृत्युः वक्ष्यमाणकार्यसिसृक्षया तत् कार्यालोचनक्षमम् , मनःशब्दवाच्यं सङ्कल्पादिलक्षणमन्तःकरणम् , अकुरुत कृतवान् । केनाभिप्रायेण मनोऽकरोदिति, उच्यते — आत्मन्वी आत्मवान् स्यां भवेयम् ; अहमनेनात्मना मनसा मनस्वी स्यामित्यभिप्रायः ।

BB 26

tanmano'kuruta, taditi manaso nirdeśaḥ ; sa prakṛto mṛtyuḥ vakṣyamāṇakāryasisṛkṣayā tat kāryālocanakṣamam , manaḥśabdavācyam saṅkalpādilakṣaṇamantaḥkaraṇam , akuruta kṛtavān | kenābhiprāyeṇa mano'karoditi, ucyate — ātmanvī ātmavān syāṃ bhaveyam ; ahamanenātmanā manasā manasvī syāmityabhiprāyaḥ |

Creation of the mind

BB 26

BHĀṢYA - The word 'tat' (that) refers to the mind. That death of whom we are talking, intending to project the effects which will be presently mentioned, created the inner organ called mind, characterized by deliberation etc. and possessing the power to reflect on those effects. What was his object in creating the mind? This is being stated: Thinking, 'Let me have a mind-through this mind (Atman) let me be possessed of a mind. This was his object.

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सः प्रजापतिः, अभिव्यक्तेन मनसा समनस्कः सन् , अर्चन् अर्चयन्पूजयन् आत्मानमेव कृतार्थोऽस्मीति, अचरत् चरणमकरोत् । तस्य प्रजापतेः अर्चतः पूजयतः आपः रसात्मिकाः पूजाङ्गभूताः अजायन्त उत्पन्नाः । अत्राकाशप्रभृतीनां त्रयाणामुत्पत्त्यनन्तरमिति वक्तव्यम् , श्रुत्यन्तरसामर्थ्यात् , विकल्पासम्भवाच्च सृष्टिक्रमस्य । अर्चते पूजां कुर्वते वै मे मह्यं कम् उदकम् अभूत् इति एवममन्यत यस्मान्मृत्युः, तदेव तस्मादेव हेतोः अर्कस्य अग्नेरश्वमेधक्रत्वौपयोगिकस्य अर्कत्वम् ; अर्कत्वे हेतुरित्यर्थः । अग्नेरर्कनामनिर्वचनमेतत् — अर्चनात्सुखहेतुपूजाकरणादप्सम्बन्धाच्चाग्नेरेतद्वौणं नामार्क इति । यः एवं यथोक्तम् अर्कस्यार्कत्वं वेद जानाति, कम् उदकं सुखं वा, नामसामान्यात् , ह वै इत्यवधारणार्थो, भवत्येवेति, अस्मै एवंविदे एवंविदर्थं भवति ॥

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saḥ prajāpatiḥ, abhivyaktena manasā samanaskaḥ san , arcan arcayanpūjayan ātmānameva kṛtārtho'smīti, acarat caraṇamakaroḥ । tasya prajāpateḥ arcataḥ pūjayataḥ āpaḥ rasātmikāḥ pūjāṅgabhūtāḥ ajāyanta utpannāḥ । atrākāśaprabhṛtīnāṃ trayāṅāmutpattyanantaramiti vaktavyam , śrutyantarasāmarthyāt , vikalpāsambhavācca sṛṣṭikramasya । arcate pūjāṃ kurvate vai me mahyaṃ kam udakam abhūt iti evamamanyata yasmānmṛtyuḥ, tadeva tasmādeva hetoḥ arkasya agneraśvamedhakratvaupayogikasya arkatvam ; arkatve heturityarthaḥ । agnerarkanāmanirvacanametat — arcanātsukhahetupūjākaraṇādapsambandhāccāgneretadgaṇaṃ nāmārka iti । yaḥ evaṃ yathoktam arkasyārkatvaṃ veda jānāti, kam udakaṃ sukhaṃ vā, nāmasāmānyāt , ha vai ityavadhāraṇārthau, bhavatyeveti, asmai evaṃvide evaṃvidarthaṃ bhavati ॥

Creation of water

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BHĀṢYA - Prajāpati, being possessed of a mind after it was manifested, moved about worshipping himself, thinking he was blessed. As he was worshipping, water, an all-liquid substance forming an accessory of the worship, was produced. Here we must supply the words, 'after the manifestation of the ether, air and fire, for another śruti (Tai.U.2.1.1) says so, and there can be no alternative in the order of manifestation. Since death thought, 'As I was worshipping, water sprang up, therefore arka, the fire that is fit for use in the horse sacrifice, is so called. This is the derivation of the name 'arka' given to fire. It is a descriptive epithet of fire derived from the performance of worship leading to happiness, and the connection with water. Water or happiness surely comes to one who knows how arka (fire) came to have this name of arka. This is due to the similarity of names. The particles 'ha' and 'vai' are intensive.

** End of Ghaṭa Bhāṣya **

